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Abstract 
 
This paper dynamically extends the noise trading model (DSSW model) via 
describing the limited rational investors’ sentiment more specifically, and using the 
bipolar sigmoid activation function in the neural network system to depict noise 
traders’ overreaction to the past changes of fundamental value. And then we construct 
an irrational speculative bubble model according to some relevant theoretical 
hypothesis, which can measure the scale of stock market bubbles precisely. Moreover, 
we also explore the plausible rang of speculative bubbles on the basis of the irrational 
bubble model. Finally, we can conclude from the results of corresponding simulations 
that the existence of irrational bubbles in the market is strongly linked to noise 
traders’ misperceptions and their inherent sentiments during the investment, as well as 
their overreaction to the historical impacts of fundamental value. Particularly, we find 
that, under the condition of given simulation parameters, the larger the proportion of 
noise traders exists in the market, the higher the degree of irrational speculative 
bubbles is included in the risky assets, and the more violent the fluctuations of stock 
market bubbles are. 
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1. Introduction 
    
Black (1986) first introduced the concept of noise into bubble theory, he thought 
that noise trading makes the market price become noise, so it can’t fully reflect the 
content of the information contained, which greatly reduces the effectiveness of the 
market. In stock trading, noise traders constantly accumulate the “noise” to the stock 
price, which leads it to deviate from its intrinsic value and imply a definite bubble 
component. This is how the stock bubbles come into being. Shiller (1984, 1990) and 
Summers (1986) established a Fashion model, which gives an explanation of 
speculative bubble formation. Shiller (1984) thought that stock prices are highly 
susceptible to pure fashion trends and the social dynamics, and the close attention 
between investors may cause stock bubbles. Summers (1986) considered that the 
deviation between asset price and market fundamental value is produced from the 
change of investor sentiment or fashion. Shiller (2000) analyzed the stock market 
speculative bubbles from the angle of investor’s psychology, he recognized that 
investors' psychological reliance, herd mentality and the feedback loop mechanism 
will result in the stock market bubbles. De Long、Shleifer、Summers and Waldmann 
(1990) (hereafter DSSW) creatively established the noise trading model (DSSW 
model), they explained the continuous deviation of stock market price relative to the 
fundamental value from the perspective of microscopic behavior, and argued that 
there are two main reasons for the formation and continuation of bubbles, one is the 
unpredictable of noise traders’ beliefs which brings a risk to asset price, the other is 
arbitrageurs’ risk aversion and short-horizon which limit their abilities to correct the 
mispricing. Binswanger (1999) dynamically extended the DSSW model in the case of 
the fundamental value is invariant and changed respectively. Since considering the 
change of fundamental value in the stock market, it makes the DSSW model more 
realistic to describe the evolutionary process of speculative bubbles. Based on the 
extended DSSW model, Wang and Yang (2005) introduced the noise traders’ 
overreaction to the historical impacts of fundamental value into their model to 
describe the formation of irrational bubbles. They found that the irrational bubbles are 
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related to such factors as noise traders’ misperceptions and overreactions. And given 
certain parameters, the proportion of noise traders affects the scale of irrational 
bubbles. 
   In particular, DSSW (1990) argued that higher investor sentiment generates more 
noise trading. This is because investor sentiment indicates noise traders’ 
misperceptions of the expected price of the risky asset and, as demonstrated by DSSW, 
noise traders’ demand for securities is proportional to their sentiments. Other 
researchers such as Trueman (1988), Shleifer and Summers (1990), Lakonishok et al. 
(1992), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Shefrin and Statman (1994), Palomino (1996), 
Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) provided the 
theoretical framework to describe the role of investor sentiment in determining stock 
prices. These studies believed that noise traders, who do not make investment based 
on the fundamental value of company, are capable of affecting stock prices by way of 
unpredictable changes in their responds. On the basis of DSSW model and relevant 
theories, several empirical studies examined the influence of investor sentiment on 
stock returns (De Bondt, 1993; Clarke and Statman, 1998; Fisher and Statman, 2000; 
Lee et al., 2002; Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Verma et al., 2008). These studies 
provided evidence for the existence of strong co-movements between individual and 
institutional investor sentiment and stock market returns. Only a few papers have 
investigated the relationship between investor sentiment and stock volatility (Brown, 
1999; Lee, Jiang and Indro, 2002; Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006). 
Throughout the above literatures, these scholars have studied irrational speculative 
bubbles from various angles, and obtained some preliminary achievements. On the 
one hand, they derived and verified the objective existence of speculative bubbles in 
asset prices, and further discussed the causes of the formation of irrational speculative 
bubbles. On the other hand, they preliminarily built a series of irrational speculative 
bubble models, and explained the evolution of irrational speculative bubbles from 
different perspectives. However, there also exist some deficiencies in the past studies 
of irrational speculative bubbles, which mainly reflect in the following aspects: first 
of all, due to the emergence and development of the stock market bubbles are not only 
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affected by macroeconomic factors, also restricted by the micro investors’ 
psychologies. Therefore, studying the speculative bubbles from the aspect of investor 
psychology is of great significance. In recent decades, the rise of behavioral finance 
provides a bridge and a link to the combination of psychology and finance. 
Throughout the current research achievements of irrational speculative bubbles, the 
combination is inadequate. Because they can be thought of as putting forward the 
phenomenon of behavior with the combination of the psychology, but didn't put 
forward it in nature. Second, the existing irrational bubble models were focused on 
the market investors’ different opinions on the future trend of stock market, and they 
only recognized the impact of investor sentiment on the stock market bubble (or 
price), but didn’t specifically measure the investor sentiment. While in the factors 
which will affect the formation of irrational speculative bubbles, investor sentiment is 
often occupies a pivotal position. So constructing the irrational bubble model 
combined with the characteristic of investor sentiment can help to better study the 
emergence and development of irrational speculative bubbles. Third, the bursting of 
stock market bubbles will bring very bad influence on all aspects of economy, social 
life, and the whole society. Thus researching the recognition and plausible range of 
speculative bubbles, and the method of pre-controlling the bubbles are of great 
significance. But the current researches are lack of them and mainly focus on 
examining the existence of speculative bubbles. 
Given all this, we expand the extended DSSW model from two main aspects in 
this paper. First, in terms of investor sentiment, this paper argues that it can affect not 
only the noise traders’ bullish or bearish on stock price, but also their levels of risk 
aversion. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) (hereafter BHS) proposed and calibrated 
a model in which investors have linear loss aversion preferences and derived gain-loss 
utility only over fluctuations in financial wealth. BHS (2001) pointed out that, if an 
investor cumulates his gains and losses, value inflection would seem to imply that he 
is more likely to take risk after a series of good outcomes, and less likely after a series 
of bad outcomes. Follow the BHS model, we posit an monotone decreasing function 
which is regard to investor sentiment to measure the degree of noise traders’ risk 
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aversion. When noise traders are bullish (bearish), they think the possibility of future 
stock market gains (losses) is big, so their degree of risk aversion is low (high). 
Another striking feature of our model is that we explicitly measure noise traders’ 
overreaction to the past changes of stock fundamental value by means of using the 
bipolar sigmoid activation function in the neural network system to replace the 
corresponding normal random variable in the extended DSSW model proposed by 
Binswanger(1999). This function measures the degree of the investors’ overreaction to 
historical information of fundamental value from two aspects: gains and losses, 
further explains the impact of investors’ overreaction on the formation of speculative 
bubbles. And then we construct an irrational speculative bubble model on the basis of 
the noise traders’ sentiment function and their overreaction function. Via these two 
extensions, the irrational speculative bubble model shows the effect of noise traders’ 
misperceptions and intrinsic sentiments, and their overreaction to the historical shocks 
of the fundamental value on the formation and persistence of stock market bubbles. 
Since the model is a blend of factors such as investors’ sentiment and their instinctive 
reaction, it can describe the evolution of the irrational speculative bubbles more 
realistically and measure the scale of irrational bubbles more precisely. After that, 
based on the principle of the consistency of the level of stock market bubbles and 
economic development, we give the plausible scope of irrational speculative bubbles 
on the basis of our irrational bubble model, which provides a reference for judging the 
rationality of the development of stock market bubbles. 
Finally, the research results indicate that the irrational bubbles are strongly linked 
to the noise traders’ misperceptions and sentiments during investment, as well as their 
overreaction to the historical changes of fundamental value. Moreover, in order to 
explore the influence of the changing of the proportion of noise traders on speculative 
bubbles, we simulate the irrational bubble model with different proportion of noise 
traders. We find that, given the fixed parameters of simulation, with the increasing 
proportion of noise traders in the market, the scale of irrational speculative bubbles in 
risky asset is larger, and the stock market bubbles will fluctuate more dramatically. 
However, the crescent proportion of noise traders will not necessarily result in the 
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gradually increment of irrational bubbles. 
   The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
construct the extend DSSW model. And the irrational bubble model follows in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the plausible range of the stock market bubbles. Section 
5 shows the multi-period extension of irrational bubble model and simulation. Section 
6 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2. The extend DSSW model 
    
DSSW (1990) separated the investors in the market into sophisticated investors 
and noise traders, and put forward the noise trading model to analyze the level of asset 
pricing. They assumed that all investors are risk aversion and used a stripped down 
overlapping generations model with two-period lived agents to describe the issues. 
And for simplicity, there is no first period consumption, no labor supply decision, and 
no bequest in their model. The only decision agents make is to choose a portfolio 
when young. 
   As the DSSW model, we assume that there are two types of traders in the market: 
informed traders (denoted by the superscript “ i ”) and noise traders (denoted by the 
superscript “ n ”). Among them, the informed traders who have rational expectations 
about the future price of risky asset are homogeneous, and they also treat the changes 
of fundamental value rationally. While noise traders are heterogeneous, who tend to 
predict asset prices according to some pseudo-signals from technical analysts, stock 
brokers, or economic consultants and irrationally believe that these signals carry 
information. Similarly, there is assumed to be a proportion   of noise traders 
inhabiting the market, leaving the remainder of the market to be populated by a 
proportion 1   of informed traders. 
   The market contains two assets that pay identical dividends. One of the assets, the 
safe asset  s , pays a fixed riskless rate r . Asset  s  is in perfectly elastic supply: 
a unit of it can be created out of and a unit of it turned back into a unit of the 
6 
 
consumption good in any period. Taking consumption each period as numeraire, the 
price of the safe asset is always fixed at one. The other asset, the unsafe asset  u , 
pays the same fixed real dividend r  as asset  s . But  u  is not in elastic supply: 
it is in fixed and unchangeable quantity, normalized at one unit. The price of  u  in 
period t  is denoted by 
tp . We usually interpret  s  as a riskless short-term bond 
and  u  as aggregate equities. Both types of traders meet in a simple two-period 
model in which they choose their portfolios when young to maximize perceived 
expected utility given their own beliefs about the ex-ante mean of the distribution of 
the price of  u  as of time 1t  . When old, they must transform their holdings of 
 s  into consumer goods, sell their holdings of  u  for price +1tp  to next 
generation and consume away all the wealth. Note that this type of “overlapping 
generation” framework means that although individual lives are described in a very 
stylized way, the continuity of financial markets can still be captured. 
   The representative sophisticated investor young in period t  accurately perceives 
the distribution of returns from holding the risky asset, and so maximizes expected 
utility given that distribution. While, the representative noise trader young in period t  
misperceives the expected price of the risky asset  u  by a time-varying amount t . 
t  is an i.i.d. normal random variable, whose mean is denoted by *  and variance 
is denoted by 
2
 , i.e.  2*,t N    . where *  is the average amount of 
“bullishness/bearishness” of the noise traders around which individual values of t  
vary each time period, and reflects the noise traders’ optimistic or pessimistic mood. 
And 
2
  is the variance of noise traders’ misperceptions of the expected return per 
unit of the risky asset. Note that all variance in the price of the unsafe asset  u  is 
induced by variations in the misperceptions of price held by noise traders, t . 
   Each informed trader’s utility is a constant absolute risk aversion function of 
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wealth when old:    2
i
iU e
    . Where   is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, i  is informed traders’ wealth. When the returns of risky assets is normal 
distribution, the expected utility function is equivalent to   2ii iE U        . 
Where i  is informed traders’ final expected wealth, 2i  is the one-period ahead 
variance of expected wealth. 
   However, in consideration of noise traders’ optimistic or pessimistic mood may 
influence their degree of risk aversion to invest risky assets, we assume that their risk 
aversion function is  g s , and then the noise traders’ expected utility function is 
   2
ng snU e
 

    . Where  g s  is the influence function of noise traders’ 
sentiment,    
1
1
n
n
i
i
g s g s

  , n  is the amount of noise traders in the market, is  is 
the sentiment of noise trader  ni  during investment. When 0is  , denotes that the 
noise traders is not with their own emotions in investment. When 0is  , denotes that 
they hold optimism about investment. On the contrary, when 0is  , denotes that they 
hold pessimism. BHS (2001) argued that investor is more likely to take risk after a 
series of gains, and less likely after a series of losses. So when noise traders are 
bullish (or optimistic), they are more willing to invest. Then according to BHS model, 
we let   0ig s  , and posit  ig s  is a monotone decreasing function. Which means 
the higher the investor sentiment is, the closer the value of  ig s  to zero. 
Particularly, when noise trader without any emotion, i.e. 0is  , then  0 1g  , 
which means the level of noise trader’s risk aversion equals to that of informed trader 
during investment. 
   Different with the DSSW model, Wang and Yang (2005) emphasized that the 
fundamental value of risky asset  u  will change, then the corresponding dividend it 
pays is tr  . Where t  is an i.i.d. normal random variable,  20 ,t N   . Due to 
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t  is only recognized by informed traders as of time t , so it only directly affect the 
expected utility of informed traders but not the noise traders’. They also assumed that 
there is a change of fundamental value as of time 1t  , which is denoted by 
1t  . 
Noise traders realized this historical impact, and overreacted to this information, 
which is measured by the overreaction coefficient  . In addition, the noise traders 
will still misperceive the expected price of the risky asset, which is also denoted by 
t , but it won’t include the noise trader’s misperception of the shock of fundamental 
value. 
   It is worth noting that, different with the setting of overreaction coefficient by 
Wang and Yang (2005), this article follow the command from investors’ psychological 
reaction -- the reaction of brain neurons, and use the bipolar sigmoid activation 
function in the neural network system to depict noise traders’ average overreaction to 
the change of fundamental value. And the expression of sigmoid function is: 
 
1 2
=1
1 1
u
u u
e
y h u
e e

 



  
 
 
Where parameter   is the gain of sigmoid function, whose value determines the 
slope of unsaturated section of the function. And the greater the value of   is, the 
steeper the curve is.  
As for the dividend payment of risky asset, we also assume the dividend it pays is 
tr  . Where  20 ,t N   . But we creatively consider noise traders’ average 
overreaction to the changes of fundamental value during the past m  periods, then 
the overreaction function can be expressed as: 
1
1
1 2
= 1
1
1 exp
m
t j m
j
t j
j
h k
m
m

 




 
 
              
  


 
Where 1k  , 0  . 
Synthesize above assumptions, the objective of the informed traders is to choose 
the amount of risky assets, 
i
t , to maximize their expected utility function:  
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       
1
2
2 2
0 1 1i t
i i i i i
t t t t t t t pE U c r p r p                        (1) 
Where 0
ic  is a function of informed traders’ first-period labor income, 
1t tp   denotes 
the informed traders’ rational expectation to 
1tp   as of time t , 1
2
tt p


denotes the 
one-period variance of 
1tp  , which is defined as   1
22
1 1tt p t t t t
E p E p
  
    . 
Similarly, on the premise that the distribution of wealth is normal distribution, the 
noise traders’ expected utility function can be defined as: 
     
    222 nn ng s g sg sn n nE U e f d e 
    
  
                          (2) 
Where        
21 / 2
2
n n
n
n
nf e 
  

 
  
  is the probability density function of 
wealth, which is normally distributed, i.e.  2, nn nN    . Due to the expected 
utility function is the increasing function of   2nn g s    , so equation (2) can be 
converted into     2nn nE U g s         . And the objective of noise traders is to 
choose the amount of risky assets, nt , to maximize their expected utility function: 
     
       
1
2
0 1
1 1
2
2
1 1
1
3
n
t
m m
n n n n
t t j t j t t t t
j j
n
t t p
E U g s c r h p r p
m m
g s

       
  

  
 
  
              
   

 
Where 0
nc  is the function of noise traders’ first-period labor income,  h   is the 
noise traders’ overreaction to the historical changes of fundamental value, t  is 
noise traders’ misperceptions of the expected price of the risky asset, and  g   is the 
influence function of noise traders’ sentiment. 
   To obtain the optimum allocation of the portfolio to the unsafe asset for informed 
traders and noise traders respectively, we need to maximize the equation (1) and (3) 
with respect to the proportion in the total market portfolio of the unsafe asset as of 
time t  held by informed traders and noise traders respectively, i.e. it  and 
n
t . 
Then we have: 
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 
   
1 1
1
2 2
1
= +
2 2
t t
i t t t t
t
t p t p
r p r p 

   
 
                                   (4) 
 
       
1 1
1 1n 1
2 2
1 1
1
= +
2 2
t t
m m
t j t j t
j jt t t
t
t p t p
h
m mr p r p
g s g s
  

   
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
                 (5) 
   Recalling the restriction that we weighted sum of total asset demands must equal 
one, i.e.  1 1i nt t     . Then combining equation (4) and (5) can yield the 
expression for the equilibrium price of risky asset  u : 
       
     
 
1
2
1 11
1 1
1 2
6
1 1 1
t
m m
t t j t j t t p
j jt t
t
g s h g s
m mr p
p
r g s r
       
 
 
 
  
      
     
     
 
   Besides period t ’s misperception by noise traders (
t ), the technological ( r ) and 
behavioral (  ) parameters of the model, and the moments of one-period ahead 
distribution of 
1tp  , Equation (6) also expresses the risky asset’s price in period t  as 
a function of noise traders’ average sentiment  g s , and their overreaction to the 
changes of fundamental value during the past m  periods. According to the 
calculation method of DSSW (1990), We also consider only steady-state equilibria by 
imposing the requirement that the unconditional distribution of 1tp   be identical to 
the distribution of tp . The endogenous one-period ahead distribution of the price of 
asset  u  can then be eliminated from (6) by solving recursively. 
   Specifically, we denote    1 g s     , 
1 1
1 1
( )
m m
t t j t j
j j
h h
m m
   
 
 
  
 
  , 
then equation (6) can be represented as: 
 
     
1
2
1
1
( ) 2
1 t
t t t t t t t pp r p h g s
r
     

       
  
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 
 
     
   
2
1
2
1 2 1 1 1 1
2
( ) 2
1 1
1
( ) 2
t
t
t t t t t t p
t
t t t t p
r r p h g s
rp
r
h g s
     
     


     
               
       
 
 
 
     
  
  
3
2
1
2
2 3 2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1
2
( ) 2
1
1 1
( ) 21
( ) 2
t
t
t
t t t t t t p
t
t t t t p
t t t t p
r r p h g s
rr
rp
h g sr
h g s
     
     
     



     
   
                   
            
     
…… 
   In this way, 
tp  becomes a weighted average of the following parts after discount: 
a. the risk-free rate  r  of assets; b. the expected price of unsafe asset in the next 
period, such as 
1t tp  , 1 2t tp  , 2 3t tp  , etc; c. the current forecast of future volatility 
of asset price, such as 
1
2
tt p


, 
2
2
1 tt p


, 
3
2
2 tt p


, etc; d. noise traders’ misperception of 
the current and future price of risky asset, such as 
t , 1t  , 2t  , etc. 
   Through forward iterating the expression of tp  infinitely, we can get the 
equilibrium price of risky asset in period t
*
: 
   
           
 
     
   
   
   
 1
1 1
2
1 1
1 *
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2*
7
1 1
t
m m
t j t j
j jt t
t
t p
h
m mg s
p
g s r g s r g s r
g s
g s r g s r
  
    
     
 
   

 
 
 
 
     
                  
 
         
 
   Due to the one-step ahead variance of tp is an unchanging function of the 
constant variance of the change of fundamental value  t  and a generation of noise 
traders’ misperception  t , and the product of 
2
  and the square of overreaction 
function   2h  : 
                                                             
* The expression of informed traders’ expectation to 1tp   at time t is
  
   
1
2
1
* 2
1
1
tt p
t t
g s
p
g s r
  
 



 
   
. 
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 
 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
12 2
2
1
1
1
t t
m
t j
j
t p p
h
m
r
       
 
 


  
    
    


                (8) 
   Finally, substituting the equation (8) into (7) can derive the final form of the 
pricing rule for risky asset  u  as of time t : 
   
           
 
     
   
   
     
 
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1 1
1 *
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 1
*
9
1 1 1
m m
t j t j
j jt t
t
m
t j
j
h
m mg s
p
g s r g s r g s r
g s h
m
g s r g s r r
  
  
    
     
       

   
 
 


 
 
     
                  
  
    
    
         
 

    
The last five terms that appear in equation (9) show the impact of noise traders on 
the price of asset  u . As the distribution of t  and t  converge to a point mass at 
zero, the equilibrium pricing function (9) converges to its fundamental value of one. 
The second and third term in (9) capture the fluctuations in the price of the risky asset 
 u  due to the changes of fundamental value, the noise traders’ overreaction and 
sentiment respectively. The forth term in (9) captures the influence of the variation of 
noise traders’ misperceptions of the expected price of risky asset. When a generation 
of noise traders is more “bullish” (“bearish”) than the average generation, which 
means their sentiments are higher (lower), then the value of  g s  is smaller (bigger), 
so they will bid up (down) the price of  u . The fifth term in (9) measures the 
deviations of tp  from its fundamental value due to the fact that the average 
misperception by noise traders is not zero. Similarly, if noise traders are “bullish” 
(“bearish”) on average, this “price pressure” effect will make the price of the risky 
asset higher (lower) than it would otherwise be. The last term in (9) expresses the 
“price suppression” effect caused by risks, which include the risks from the changes 
of fundamental value and the noise traders’ misperception of the future price of risky 
asset. 
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3. The irrational speculative bubble model 
    
When informed traders and noise traders coexist in the market, the equilibrium 
price will be decided jointly by these two types of traders, so we can use both the 
proportion of risky assets they held and the corresponding prices they expected to 
denote it: 
     1 1i i n n i i n i i nt t t t t t t t t t t t tp p p p p b p b                      (10) 
Where itp  is the reasonable price of risky asset when there are only informed traders 
in the market; ntp  is the price of risky asset which contains the irrational speculative 
bubbles, and it’s determined only by noise traders; 
tb  represents the irrational 
speculative bubbles which is generated when the noise traders are irrational; nt tb  
denotes the scale of irrational bubbles when these two types of traders coexist in the 
market, which is the difference between market equilibrium price and the reasonable 
price of risky asset. Fortunately, we can calculate the scale of irrational speculative 
bubbles contained in the market equilibrium price only by confirming the reasonable 
price of risky assets. 
   When there are only informed investors exist in the market, their utility function is 
still  iE U    , and the risk they meet only comes from the change of fundamental 
value. So we can calculate the price of risky asset decided by informed traders. Due to 
the amount of risky assets is fixed and standardized on one, so the supply of risky 
assets is equal to demand when the market is balanced, i.e. 1it  . Similar to above 
calculation method, we can derive the equilibrium price of risky assets: 
 
1
2
1
1
2
1 t
t t t t t pp r p
r
  

    
 
. In view of the risk at the moment is only caused 
by the change of fundamental value, i.e. 
 1 1
2
2 2
2
1
t tt p p
r
 
 
 

, we can calculate the 
price of risky asset which is decided by informed traders through the method of 
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recursive computation. Then we have:  
 
 
1
2 2
2
2 2
1 1
1 1 1
tt pi t t
tp
r r r r r

        
  
                      (11) 
   Finally, substituting the equation (9) and (11) into (10) can conclude the scale of 
irrational speculative bubbles at time t  when the market is balanced: 
 
               
 
     
       
     
2 2 2 2 2
11 1
2
=p
* *
12
1 1 1 1 1
11 1
2 2 1
1 1 1 1
n i
t t t t t
t t
mm m
t jt j t j
jj j
B b p
g s r g s r g s r
g s g s h g sh
mm m
g s r g s r r
 

    
     
          
   
 
 
 

  
                 
   
       
      
          
 
   The five terms situated on the right side of equation (12) show the influence of 
noise traders on the scale of irrational speculative bubbles. Among them, the first term 
captures the impact of the variation of noise traders’ misperceptions and their 
sentiment on the volatility of irrational speculative bubbles. For example, when a 
generation of noise traders are more “bullish” (“bearish”) than the average generation, 
which means their sentiment are higher (lower), then the value of  g s  is smaller 
(bigger). Finally, the interplay of these two factors will accelerate the expansion 
(contraction) of irrational speculative bubbles. Similarly, the second term shows the 
movements of irrational speculative bubbles caused by noise traders’ average 
misperceptions and sentiments. Specifically, when 0  ( 0 ), which means 
noise traders are “bullish” (“bearish”) , then this optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment 
will lead to the expansion (contraction) of bubbles with the gradual increase (decrease) 
of    and the gradual decrease (increase) of  g s . The third term mainly reflects 
the negative effect of the shock of fundamental value at time t  on the bubbles, which 
noise traders didn’t realized. When the shock of dividend is positive, informed traders 
will take active trading strategies, while noise traders won’t take the corresponding 
trading strategies because their under-reaction to current information, which will 
cause the equilibrium price of risky asset can’t fully reflect the positive shock brought 
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by the fundamental value. At the same time, with the increase of the reasonable price 
of risky asset, the scale of irrational bubbles will relatively reduce. All this effect is 
because of the noise traders’ under-reaction on the current shock of fundamental value. 
The forth term captures the fluctuations in the irrational speculative bubbles due to the 
changes of fundamental value during past m  periods which noise traders have 
recognized, and the noise traders’ overreaction to these changes and their sentiments. 
When the mean value of the changes of fundamental value during the past m  
periods is greater than zero, noise traders will take active trading strategies, which 
leads to the generation of irrational bubbles followed by the rising of equilibrium 
price. Note that the overreaction function  h   is related to the speed of the 
expansion or contraction of the irrational bubbles. When the value of  h   is greater 
than one, the noise traders’ reaction to the shocks of fundamental value will increase 
multiply, which will result in the accelerating expansion or contraction of irrational 
bubbles. In particular, if noise traders find that the average changes of fundamental 
value during the past m  periods is positive, they will mistakenly think that buying 
risky assets will profit and take active trading strategies, which leads to the rapid 
swelling of irrational bubbles with the exaggerated value of overreaction function. On 
the contrary, if the mean value of these shocks is negative, noise traders mistakenly 
believe that they are losing money and decide to hold the risky assets. As a result, 
following by the smaller value of overreaction function, the scale of irrational bubbles 
decrease quickly. In the end, the last item in equation (12) expresses the “bubble 
suppression” effect caused by risks, which include the risks from the changes of 
fundamental value and the noise traders’ overreaction to these changes during past m  
periods, as well as their sentiments. 
 
4. The plausible range of stock market bubbles 
    
In many functions of the stock market, financing is one of the most basic 
functions among them. It is well known that support from the financing function of 
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stock market to the economic development of a country is particularly important. 
Thus, we can’t neglect the impact of the emergence of stock market bubbles on the 
investment and financing of whole market, as well as the development of the real 
economy. And so is the change of the scale of stock market bubbles. As inflation is a 
double-edged sword, a moderate amount of stock market bubbles are able to activate 
the investment and financing of the whole market, while large stock market bubbles 
will cause an devastating consequence on the stock market and real economy. 
Therefore, no matter how the scale of stock market bubbles is too large or too small, it 
will be not conducive to the healthy development of stock market and the real 
economy. In view of this, we consult the model proposed by Feng and Sun (2005) to 
explore the plausible range of stock market bubbles by the relationship between the 
stock market bubbles and the real economy.  
   From the perspective of speculation, we suppose that the objective of investors’ 
participation in the stock trading is to gain from the spread of stock prices. On the one 
hand, because of the profit instinct of capital, the yield of the stock market must be 
higher than bonds and bank deposits or other investment channels which can attract 
capital, or it will not perform the market function of funding. On the other hand, the 
yield of the stock market can't exceed the ROE of industrial investments, the 
resources of the real economy will otherwise come back to the stock market for 
speculation, which will be bad for the healthy development of the real economy. At 
the mean time, since the trading time is so short that the investors will face bigger 
risks, thus we should take the risk premium of the stock market into account. 
   To sum up, the quantitative relationship between the investors’ yields in stock 
market at time t , the risk-free rate and the average  ROE of industrial investments 
can be express as follows: 
 tr E R erp R                                               (13) 
Where r  denotes the risk-free interest rate,  tE R  is the expected rate of return 
which investors obtain in period t  by investing the stock market, erp  indicates the 
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average risk premium in the stock market, and R  denotes the ROAE (Return On 
Average Equity) of all the list companies. 
According to the assumption of above irrational speculative bubble model which 
is related to investor sentiment, we can obtain the expected yield of all investors in 
period t : 
   
1 1
1 1
1
m m
t t t j t j
j j
E R r h
m m
     
 
 
     
 
                       (14) 
   Combining equation (12) and (14), we have: 
       1 1t t t tE R g s r B                                 (15) 
Where 
       
     
2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
2 2 1
*
1 1
m
t j
j
g s g s h g s
m
r
r g s r r
         

 


  
     
      
    

. 
At the end, according to equation (13) and (15), the plausible range of stock 
market bubbles can be derived as follows: 
min maxtB B B                                                 (16) 
Where 
     min 1 1
t tr erpB
g s r
 
 
   

    
, 
     max 1 1
t tR erpB
g s r
 
 
   

    
. 
   From the expression of the plausible range of stock market bubbles, we can find 
that the range is also relevant to the noise traders’ misperceptions of the expected 
price of the risky asset and overreactions to the historical shocks of fundamental value, 
as well as their intrinsic sentiments during investment. 
 
5. The multi-period extension and simulation of the irrational bubble model  
 
This section will simulate the impact of noise traders on the tendency of stock 
prices and irrational bubbles according to equation (9) and (12) respectively, and 
accomplish a numerical simulation of the plausible range of stock market bubbles on 
the basis of equation (16). 
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5.1 The simulation on the tendency of stock prices 
    
Since the extended DSSW model is a two-period model, in order to study the 
dynamic movements of the irrational bubbles more than two periods, we must expand 
it to more periods. We assume that *  obeys a random walk process, which is 
defined as 1
* *
t t t    . Through iteration we can get 0
0
* *
t
t i
i
  

  . Where 
 20 ,t N   . In addition, there exist erratic swings on noise traders’ misperception 
in period t , which is defined as 
t . It’s also an i.i.d. normal random variable and its 
specific distribution is  20 ,t N   , so we have 1* *t t t t t t          . 
Where 
t  denotes the long-term fluctuation of noise traders’ misperception, and has 
a permanent impact on the price of risky asset; while 
t  measures the temporary 
shocks on noise traders’ misperception, and only affects the price of risky asset in a 
short time. Now, we posit these two random variables are independent, then we have 
2 2 2
      , so the final form of the pricing rule for risky asset  u  (i.e. equation 
(9)) can be converted into: 
   
           
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   
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        
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   
 
 
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
 
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                  
  
     
    
         
 

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  


. 
   Moreover, for the purpose of simulating the noise traders’ sentiments concretely, 
this paper assumes that the specific form of the influence function of noise traders’ 
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sentiment is a negative exponential function, i.e.   isig s e
 , which satisfies the 
constraint conditions above. Where 0   is called the influence coefficient of noise 
traders’ sentiment, which expresses the effect degree of noise traders’ sentiment on 
their levels of risk aversion. According to the research result of Baker and Wurger 
(2006), we let the value of noise trader’ sentiment 
is  follow the uniform distribution 
which is from minus two to three in the simulation, i.e.  2 , 3is U  . 
   In order to reflect the impact of the increasing proportion of noise traders on the 
tendency of stock price 
tp , under the condition of given parameters and with the 
assumption that the proportion of noise traders is 5%、10% and 50% separately, this 
paper simulates the corresponding movements of stock price respectively. Detailed 
simulative results are shown in figure 1. 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
 
 
p1
p2
p3
 
Figure 1 The simulation on the tendency of stock prices within 500 periods 
 
Fig.1. Random number generator is used to determine the values of normal random variable t 、
t  and t  within 500 periods respectively, whose mean is all zero, while its variance is 
2 1  ,
2 0.05   and 
2 1   respectively; and we posit the initial price is one; there are a 
total of one million investors in the market, i.e. 1,000,000N  ; the risk-free rate 0.05r  , 
the coefficient of investor's risk aversion is equal to one, i.e. 1  , the periods in which the 
noise traders will overreact to the changes of fundamental value is equal to five, i.e. 5m  ; the 
corresponding parameters in noise traders’ overreaction function are set to 2k  , 1  ; noise 
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traders’ average misperception of 
+1t tp  at the beginning is also equal to one, i.e. 1
* 1   
(illustrates that noise traders are “long” at the beginning). In addition, we also assume that the 
influence coefficient of noise traders’ sentiment is equal to one, i.e. 1  , and use the random 
number generator again to generate the values of the  2 , 3  uniformly distributed random 
variable 
is ; n  denotes the amount of noise traders in the market (When the proportion of noise 
traders in the market is 0.05, 0.1 and 0.5, the corresponding number of noise traders is 
1 0.05n N , 2 0.1n N  and 3 0.5n N respectively). Finally, we simulate the corresponding 
sequences  tp  with different proportion of noise traders, which is denotes by ip , where 
1, 2, 3i   represents the proportion of noise traders is 0.05、0.1 and 0.5 respectively. 
 
Figure 1 shows that with an increasing proportion of noise traders in the market 
compared to the informed traders, the overall trend of stock price will gradually 
deviate from its fundamental value. And the volatility of stock price is becoming more 
and more dramatic, which increases the risk of the stock market crash. Therefore, 
combining with the pricing function of risky asset, we can infer that the noise traders’ 
proportion, their overreaction to historical changes of fundamental value and their 
sentiments in the process of investment can lead the stock price deviate from its 
fundamental value, and cause the instability of the stock market. 
 
5.2 The simulation on the tendency of irrational speculative bubbles  
    
Similarly, by multi-period extension, the expression (12) of irrational speculative 
bubbles can be converted into: 
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   With the purpose of exploring different proportion of noise traders how to affect 
the tendency of speculative bubbles 
tB , under the condition of given parameters and 
with the assumption that the proportion of noise traders is 5%、10% and 50% 
separately, we simulate the corresponding movements of irrational speculative 
bubbles respectively. Detailed simulative results are shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2 The simulation on the tendency of irrational bubbles within 500 periods 
 
Fig.2. Random number generator is used to determine the values of normal random variable t 、
t  and t  within 500 periods respectively, whose mean is all zero, while its variance is 
2 1  ,
2 0.05   and 
2 1   respectively; and we posit the initial price is one; there are a 
total of one million investors in the market, i.e. 1,000,000N  ; the risk-free rate 0.05r  , 
the coefficient of investor's risk aversion is equal to one, i.e. 1  , the periods in which the noise 
traders will overreact to the changes of fundamental value is equal to five, i.e. 5m  ; the 
corresponding parameters in noise traders’ overreaction function are set to 2k  , 1  ; noise 
traders’ average misperception of +1t tp  at the beginning is also equal to one, i.e. 1
* 1   
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(illustrates that noise traders are “long” at the beginning). In addition, we also assume that the 
influence coefficient of noise traders’ sentiment is equal to one, i.e. 1  , and use the random 
number generator again to generate the values of the  2 , 3  uniformly distributed random 
variable 
is ; n  denotes the amount of noise traders in the market (When the proportion of noise 
traders in the market is 0.05, 0.1 and 0.5, the corresponding number of noise traders is 
1 0.05n N , 2 0.1n N  and 3 0.5n N respectively). Finally, we simulate the corresponding 
sequences  tB  with different proportion of noise traders, which is denotes by iB , where 
1, 2, 3i   represents the proportion of noise traders is 0.05、0.1 and 0.5 respectively. 
 
From figure 2 we can find that in the condition of giving related parameters, the 
larger the proportion of noise traders is, the vaster the scale of irrational speculative 
bubbles exists, and the larger the amplitude of fluctuation is. And with the 
enhancement of the volatility of irrational bubbles, the possibility of their bursting is 
gradually increased. Therefore, according to the setting of the irrational bubble model, 
we can deduce that the reasons for the generation of irrational speculative bubbles in 
the stock market are including the noise traders’ misperception of the future price and 
their inherent sentiments in the process of investment, as well as their overreaction to 
the historical changes of fundamental value. 
 
5.3 The simulation on the plausible range of stock market bubbles 
    
Finally, building on the assumptions and theories we summarized above, we can 
get the plausible range of stock market bubbles as follows: 
min maxtB B B           
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   In this section we only simulate the trend of the stock market bubbles and their 
plausible range when the proportion of noise traders is 0.1, and posit the average risk 
premium in the stock market is 0.08, i.e. =0.08erp , the ROAE (Return On Average 
Equity) of all the list companies is 0.16, i.e. =0.16R . Detailed simulative results are 
shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 The simulation on the plausible range of bubbles within 50 periods 
 
Fig.3. Random number generator is used to determine the values of normal random variable t 、
t  and t  within 50 periods respectively, whose mean is all zero, while its variance is 
2 1  ,
2 0.05   and 
2 1  ; and we posit the initial price is one; there are a total of one 
million investors in the market, i.e. 1,000,000N  ; the risk-free rate 0.05r  , the coefficient 
of investor's risk aversion is equal to one, i.e. 1  , the periods in which the noise traders will 
overreact to the changes of fundamental value is equal to five, i.e. 5m  ; the corresponding 
parameters in noise traders’ overreaction function are set to 2k  , 1  ; noise traders’ average 
misperception of +1t tp  at the beginning is also equal to one, i.e. 1
* 1   (illustrates that noise 
traders are “long” at the beginning). In addition, we also assume that the influence coefficient of 
noise traders’ sentiment is equal to one, i.e. 1  , and use the random number generator again to 
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generate the values of the  2 , 3  uniformly distributed random variable is , where n  
denotes the amount of noise traders in the market (When the proportion of noise traders in the 
market is 0.1, the corresponding number of noise traders is 0.1n N ).  
 
5.4 The influence of changing proportion of noise traders on irrational bubbles 
    
In order to concretely research the impact of changing proportion of noise traders 
on irrational bubbles, we will assume that the change of the proportion of noise 
traders obeys the following rule: cos 1.2 3
500
t
M t
 
  
      
  
, which is proposed 
by Yang (2008). Due to the proportion is posited to obey the cosine function, so the 
cycle of changing proportion of noise traders is 
2
/ 500M t


, and the interval for the 
change of the proportion is 
0.2 2.2
,
3 3
 
  
. This assumption conforms to the shift 
relationship between informed traders and noise traders. Then we simulate the trend 
of irrational bubbles according to equation (18) in the conditions of setting 2M   
and 4M   respectively, and the other parameters are in accordance with above. The 
simulative results are shown in figure 4 and figure 5. 
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Figure 4 The simulation on the trend of irrational bubbles within 500 periods ( 2M  ) 
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Figure 5 The simulation on the trend of irrational bubbles within 500 periods ( 4M  ) 
 
Fig.4. & Fig.5.  Random number generator is used to determine the values of normal random 
variable 
t 、 t  and t  within 500 periods respectively, whose mean is all zero, while its 
variance is 
2 1  ,
2 0.05   and 
2 1  ; and we posit the initial price is one; there are a 
total of one million investors in the market, i.e. 1,000,000N  ; the risk-free rate 0.05r  , 
the coefficient of investor's risk aversion is equal to one, i.e. 1  , the periods in which the noise 
traders will overreact to the changes of fundamental value is equal to five, i.e. 5m  ; the 
corresponding parameters in noise traders’ overreaction function are set to 2k  , 1  ; noise 
traders’ average misperception of 
+1t tp  at the beginning is also equal to one, i.e. 1
* 1   
(illustrates that noise traders are “long” at the beginning). In addition, we also assume that the 
influence coefficient of noise traders’ sentiment is equal to one, i.e. 1  , and use the random 
number generator again to generate the values of the  2 , 3  uniformly distributed random 
variable tis , tn  denotes the amount of noise traders in the market (When the proportion of noise 
traders in the market is t , the corresponding number of noise traders is t tn N ). Finally, we 
simulate the corresponding sequences  tB  with different t .  
    
With the combination of figures 4 and 5, we can find that when the proportion of 
noise traders is small, the scale of irrational bubbles is also small, while the bubbles 
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will inflate with the increasing of the percentage of noise traders. But the bigger the 
proportion of noise traders is, the larger scale of the irrational bubbles becomes is not 
always true. This is because noise traders’ psychologies are changing during the 
inflation of irrational bubbles, only when there are exist adverse changes in the noise 
traders’ misperceptions and other related random variables, the irrational bubbles will 
lessen or even burst. In addition, figures 4 and 5 also show that when the proportion 
of noise traders is very small, the irrational bubbles are hardly formative and inflated, 
and only increasing the proportion of noise traders can the irrational bubbles will 
expand. In the end, through the simulations we can conclude that the irrational 
behavior of noise traders is indeed an important reason for the generation and 
expansion of the irrational speculative bubbles. 
 
6. Conclusion 
    
According to the different assumptions for investors, stock market bubbles can be 
classified into rational bubbles and irrational bubbles. On the basis of investors’ 
rational expectation hypothesis, the rational bubble model can study the existence of 
rational bubbles, but it can’t analyze the specific factors of causing price to deviate 
from its fundamental value. While behavioral finance avoids the hypotheses of 
investors are rational and market is completely effective, it depict the composition of 
asset price bubble from the perspective of the investors are irrational, which is more 
realistic and can effectively explain the reason of the generation mechanism of stock 
market bubbles more than other theories. In view of this, this article constructs the 
irrational speculative bubble model which is based on the noise trading model (DSSW 
model). Through relevant extension, the irrational speculative bubble model analyzes 
the role of noise traders’ misperceptions and typical sentiments, and their overreaction 
to the historical changes of the fundamental value in the generation of stock market 
bubbles. It also identified the scale of irrational bubbles and contributed a lot to the 
sureness of the plausible range of irrational bubbles. The research result shows that 
the irrational bubbles is closely related to the noise traders’ misperceptions of the 
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expected return of the risky asset and their intrinsic sentiments in the process of 
investment, as well as their overreaction to the historical changes of fundamental 
value. In particular, by setting the parameters of simulation to fixed values, we find 
that under certain conditions, the more the noise traders are in the market, the more 
the irrational speculative bubbles contained in risky asset, and the greater the 
fluctuation of the stock market bubbles is. But the crescent proportion of noise traders 
will not necessarily result in the gradual inflation of irrational bubbles. At last, we 
suggest that the market should constantly foster the investors’ rational investment 
philosophy and improve the investors’ diathesis to restrain the growth and expansion 
of irrational bubbles and stabilize the stock market. 
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